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Preferences profoundly influence decision-making and are often acquired through
experience, yet it is unclear what role conscious awareness plays in the formation and
persistence of long-term preferences and to what extent they can be altered by new
experiences. We paired visually masked cues with monetary gains or losses during a
decision-making task. Despite being unaware of the cues, subjects were influenced by
their predictive values over successive trials of the task, and also revealed a strong
preference for the appetitive over the aversive cues in supraliminal choices made days after
learning. Moreover, the preferences were resistant to an intervening procedure designed
to abolish them by a change in reinforcement contingencies, revealing a surprising
resilience once formed. Despite their power however, the preferences were abolished
when this procedure took place shortly after reactivating the memories, indicating that
the underlying affective associations undergo reconsolidation. These findings highlight the
importance of initial experiences in the formation of long-lasting preferences even in the
absence of consciousness, while suggesting a way to overcome them in spite of their
resiliency.
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INTRODUCTION
Humans and animals can learn to predict future reinforcement
and make appropriate responses based upon knowledge of its
contingency with environmental cues and actions. Experimental
analysis has demonstrated that in associative learning paradigms
contingent CS-US (conditioned stimulus—unconditioned stim-
ulus) pairings (observational or via instrumental responses) have
the potential to create multiple associative representations in the
brain (Mackintosh, 1983; Cardinal et al., 2002; Dickinson and
Balleine, 2002). Some of these associations enable stimuli to
become imbued with the affective and motivational properties of
the reinforcers they predict, and go on to independently influ-
ence intentional action and goal-directed behavior in a number
of powerful ways (Cardinal et al., 2002; Dickinson and Balleine,
2002; Everitt et al., 2003; Berridge, 2004; Everitt and Robbins,
2005; Berridge and Aldridge, 2009).
A common manifestation of this phenomenon is that con-
ditioning can engender a change in the hedonic evaluation of
stimuli, leading to the formation of preferences (likes and dis-
likes), which profoundly guide behavior and choice (Rozin et al.,
1998; De Houwer et al., 2001; Baeyens et al., 2005b; Hofmann
et al., 2010). Indeed, it is thought that most preferences are
learned rather than innate. However, the neuropsychological basis
and the behavioral characteristics of these hedonic evaluations are
unclear, since it is not certain whether their expression simply
reflects declarative knowledge/memory of stimulus (-action)-
reinforcement contingencies/pairings. A convincing account of
this learning necessitates the elimination of the declarative
component, but whether preferences can be acquired by humans,
without conscious awareness and persist over time is currently
unknown (Field, 2000; De Houwer et al., 2001; Lovibond and
Shanks, 2002; Baeyens et al., 2005a; Hofmann et al., 2010). Here,
we address this question in order to delineate the learning and
memory characteristics of preferences, to understand their fate
in response to the passage of time and new experiences, and to
assess how these qualities differ from other forms of conditioned
responses.
A unique feature of preferences is that they remain relatively
stable over one’s lifetime. This resilience has also been observed
experimentally, where supraliminally acquired preferences appear
to be resistant to extinction training protocols (Baeyens et al.,
1988, 2005a,b; De Houwer et al., 2001; Vansteenwegen et al.,
2006; Dwyer et al., 2009; Hofmann et al., 2010), though not
always in all aspects (Delamater, 2007). However, such a result
might be unremarkable if we assume that preferences based upon
declarative memory are less affected by extinction training than
are more implicitly acquired associations, in particular due to
the ability to recall and re-experience initial experiences using
episodic memory. Thus, by assessing whether preferences can be
acquired associatively in the absence of awareness we were also
able to address this issue by determining what effect a change
in reward/punishment contingencies has on the degree of liking
or disliking of a stimulus. If associatively learned preferences are
indeed resilient to subsequent experiences and new learning, we
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speculated that it may be possible to harness the phenomenon
of reconsolidation—a putative retrieval induced memory lability
(Nader, 2003; Dudai, 2006)—to alter or abolish them. Such a
finding could suggest a possible route to treatment for disor-
ders associated with intense liking or disliking of stimuli, such
as addiction and phobias. For example, might the preference
for contexts (conditioned place preference) and cues associated
with drug taking be amenable to a disruption of reconsolida-
tion? Indeed, a nascent proposal (Miller and Marshall, 2005;
Debiec and LeDoux, 2006; Kindt et al., 2009; Milton and Everitt,
2010; Schiller et al., 2010; Xue et al., 2012) to manipulate recon-
solidation, in order to abolish the aberrant emotional salience
of cues which dominate behavior in post-traumatic stress dis-
order and addiction, is gaining traction. But while evidence
from human fear conditioning indicates that fear memories—
gaged by skin conductance responses (SCRs)—undergo recon-
solidation in humans (see Schiller and Phelps, 2011), it is not
yet known whether a similar propensity is shown by affective
properties of CSs that influence higher order behaviors such
as preference formation, which are critical in the abovemen-
tioned disorders; nor whether reconsolidation in humans is spe-
cific to primary aversive conditioning or extends to appetitive
and more abstract, or secondary reinforcement, as recent evi-
dence from studies of cigarette craving would suggest (Xue et al.,
2012).
To address these questions, we examined subliminal instru-
mental learning using appetitive and aversive secondary rein-
forcement in humans. Our first aim was to determine if
instrumental behaviors and preferences to discriminatory stim-
uli can be acquired without conscious awareness, and if so,
whether they can influence long-term decision-making. We
next assessed whether the associations learned in our task
could be altered by an additional phase of subliminal learn-
ing where the reward/punishment contingencies were altered,
such that the stimuli were no longer discriminatory. Finally,
we probed the question of whether they undergo reconsoli-
dation, by examining if application of this contingency shift
during the hypothetical reconsolidation window following mem-
ory reactivation is more efficacious in altering instrumental
task responses and preferences than the manipulation with no
reactivation.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Forty four participants (28 female, 16 male; mean age of 25.1 ±
3.4 years) were recruited from the Weizmann Institute of Science
and the Faculty of Agriculture of the Hebrew University, Rehovot.
Four participants were excluded from the analyses; two because
they performed significantly above chance in the perceptual
discrimination and or recognition tasks, and another two for
constantly making a “Go,” “No-Go” or fixed alternate response
in all trials of one of the testing sessions (see below). There
remained 19 participants in the reconsolidation group and 21 in
the control group. The experimental protocol was approved by
the Institutional Review Board of the Sourasky Medical Center,
Tel-Aviv and written informed consent was obtained from all
participants.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
Overview
The experiment took place over three consecutive days. On day 1
we employed a subliminal instrumental conditioning procedure
which utilized discriminative stimuli (SDs) for reward and pun-
ishment (day 1; Figure 1A). This comprised rapidmasked presen-
tations of Japanese characters, which acted as appetitive (S+ app)
and aversive (S + av) discriminative stimuli, by way of a sub-
sequent instrumental “Go/No-Go” response. A “Go” response
led to a small monetary gain following the S + app and an
equivalent loss following the S + av. A “No-Go” response led
to a neutral outcome in both cases. Subjects were instructed to
rely on their gut feeling to make as much money as possible by
responding appropriately to the stimuli. Following learning there
was a test session where the same stimuli were presented but no
feedback was provided after the choice—though still playing for
money. On day 2, subjects underwent a new phase of learning
(phase 2) which entailed additional learning trials under non-
differential reward/punishment contingencies (i.e., the stimuli
were rendered non-discriminatory) (Figure 1B). In this phase the
stimulus-response-outcome contingencies were altered by pair-
ing each of the stimuli with a 50/50 win/lose outcome for the
“Go” response. This procedure differs from extinction learning
where the US is simply omitted, and reversal, where contingen-
cies are entirely switched. In the reconsolidation group, phase 2
learning took place 10min after reactivation by way of five test
trials for each S+ (with monetary outcomes but no feedback),
whereas in the control group it took place 10min after entering
the testing room but without reactivation. Affective evaluations
of the stimuli were gaged with a supraliminal preference task,
conducted following a further test session on day 3. In this task
subjects were required tomake binary choices between all possible
combinations of S+ app, S+ av and neutral stimuli (S−), accord-
ing to their preferences. The subliminal nature of acquisition,
reactivation and phase 2 manipulation was crucial since declar-
ative knowledge strongly influences higher order behavior and it
is unlikely that the phase 2 non-differential contingencies would
have erased declarative knowledge of the contingencies on day
1 in either group, leaving preference to be determined by some
reckoning of what was experienced over the different sessions (i.e.,
the various stimulus-reward/punishment contingencies).
Day 1
On day 1, participants were randomly assigned to one of two
conditions—control or reconsolidation. Six stimuli taken from a
set of Japanese characters (matched for size and complexity) were
then randomly ordered to form three pairs of stimuli that were
assigned to the subject for all 3 days: S + app, S + av (1st pair);
S + app, S + av (2nd pair); S−1, S−2. The same six characters
(randomized) were used for all subjects.
Discriminated instrumental conditioning (phase 1 learning)
was implemented subliminally using a technique similar to
Pessiglione et al. (2008) (Figure 1A). Each trial of learning started
with masked presentation of a S+ on a PC. Mask 1 was first
presented for 67ms, followed by the S+ for 50ms, followed by
mask 2 for 67ms. Masks 1 and 2 differed and comprised roughly
10 overlapping and rotated Japanese characters. These masks
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FIGURE 1 | Subliminal conditioning procedure and experimental
protocol. (A) A single trial of the subliminal, discriminated instrumental
conditioning task used in acquisition on day 1. The S + depicted in this
trial is appetitive (S + app) since a “Go” response always led to
monetary gain following its presentation. (B) In test trials no feedback
was provided but money could still be won or lost whereas in the
non-discriminatory phase 2 trials a “Go” response led to a 50/50
win/loss outcome for all S + s. The critical manipulation in the
reconsolidation group was reactivation prior to phase 2 learning on
day 2.
were identical for all subjects and remained the same through-
out the experiment. Following presentation of the S+ subjects
were cued to make a response. This phase lasted 2 s during which
they could make a “Go” response (pressing the space bar) or
a “No-Go” response (not pressing the space bar). In all learn-
ing trials, a “No-Go” response was followed by presentation of
a neutral outcome—a gray square—whereas the outcome of the
“Go” response depended on the preceding S+. If the appetitive
S+ (S + app) was presented, a “Go” response was followed by
a picture indicating they had won one shekel (≈25 ), whereas
if the aversive S+ (S + av) was presented, it was followed by a
picture indicating they had lost one shekel (see Supplementary
information for task instructions provided to subjects). Note
that any task with an instrumental contingency between stim-
ulus, response, and outcome (S-R-O) also contains within it a
Pavlovian type contingency between stimulus and outcome (S-O)
and consequently, behavior can be influenced by a number of
possible associations (Rescorla and Solomon, 1967; Mackintosh,
1983; Colwill and Rescorla, 1988).
Test trials were identical to learning trials except that no feed-
back was provided following responses—the subsequent trial
began immediately following the 2 s response period. Subjects
could still win or lose money during these trials and were aware
of this.
In each round there were 80 trials of learning comprising
40 randomized presentations of each S+. Immediately following
learning there were an additional 40 test trials (20 randomized
presentations of each S+). There were two rounds of learning
and testing, corresponding to the two pairs of S + s assigned to
each subject. Learning of the second pair followed testing of the
first and subjects were alerted between transitions from learning
to testing and between rounds (Figure 1B).
In addition, subjects were given perceptual discrimina-
tion tasks, prior to and following the conditioning procedure
(Figure 1B)—the purpose of these tasks was to control for any
conscious ability to discriminate stimuli. In these trials two stim-
uli were presented sequentially with an inter-stimulus interval of
2 s. They were presented in exactly the same manner as in the
conditioning and test trials, using the same masks (Figure 2). For
these trials an additional pair of Japanese characters were selected
(i.e., not used in conditioning or subsequent tasks) and were iden-
tical for all subjects and in the pre and post-conditioning sessions.
An algorithm selected one of the two stimuli randomly for each
stimulus presentation in each trial (leading to four possible trial
types: stimulus 1 (same), stimulus 2 (same), stimulus 1-then-2
(different), stimulus 2-then-1 (different). Following the second
stimulus, a choice presented on the screen prompted the sub-
ject to indicate whether they thought the two stimuli were the
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FIGURE 2 | Perceptual discrimination task. Performed prior to and post-acquisition on day 1. Shown is one trial (in this case a “same” trial).
same or different, using either the left or right shift key. Subjects’
response prompted the next trial to begin. There was no feed-
back provided on their responses and no monetary incentive
was offered for correct/incorrect answers (i.e., no reinforcement)
(Figure 2).
Each of the discrimination tasks comprised 60 trials. In the
pre-conditioning task, the stimulus duration was set at 50ms
(i.e., between the masks). Following these 60 trials a binomial test
was automatically performed to assess whether accuracy for the
subject was significantly above chance—if so, another 60 discrim-
ination trials were performed where the stimulus duration was set
to 33ms. The purpose here was to set the stimulus duration for all
subsequent procedures throughout the experiment, for each sub-
ject. In practice, no subject was able to discriminate above chance
with a 50ms stimulus duration, in the pre-conditioning test.
A short practice session of discrimination, learning and test
trials was provided before the first discrimination task (utiliz-
ing additional characters that did not appear in any subsequent
tasks). Subjects were debriefed at the end of testing regarding how
well they thought they had done, if they thought they had learned
anything and what they could describe about the stimuli.
Day 2
On day two subjects returned to the testing room for the phase
2 learning procedure. These trials were identical to the learn-
ing trials on day 1 except here a “Go” response led to a 50/50
win/loss outcome (i.e., irrespective of the S+)—that is the S + s
were now rendered non-differential/discriminatory with respect
to their reward and punishment contingencies. A round of phase
2 learning comprised 60 trials (30 randomized presentations of
each S+) and each subject underwent two rounds. The S + app
and S + av pairs used in each round were the same S+ pairs that
were used for that subject in acquisition rounds 1 and 2 on day 1.
The reminder session (for the reconsolidation group) comprised
20 test trials (i.e., no feedback, but playing for money) lasting less
than 2min. Each S+ from day 1 was tested five times successively.
The same instructions used for the learning task on day 1 were
provided for the phase 2 trials. It was not specified if the stimuli
were the same or different to those used in the prior day’s trials.
Subjects assigned to the reconsolidation condition (the reconsol-
idation group) underwent a reminder session when they entered
the room, waited 10min and then proceeded to the phase 2 tri-
als. The purpose of these reminders was to reactivate the learned
associations from day 1 and hence open the hypothetical recon-
solidation window. Reconsolidation subjects were told that there
was a short test of what they had learned on the previous day and
that they could still win/lose on those test trials. Control group
subjects did not undergo reactivation and started the phase 2 tri-
als following a 10min waiting period upon entering the testing
room (Figure 1B).
Day 3
On day 3 subjects returned to the testing room where they were
given three separate tasks. The first task comprised test trials that
were identical to those on day 1 (as well as to the reminders on
day 2 for the reconsolidation subjects). As on day 1, no feed-
back was provided but the subjects could still win or lose money
with “Go” responses. There were two rounds (testing each sub-
ject specific pair of S + s conditioned on day 1 and rendered
non-discriminatory on day 2), each comprising 80 trials (40
randomized presentations of each S+).
The remaining tasks on day 3 were supraliminal in nature.
The second task was a recognition test where each of the six
stimuli—S + app, S + av and S− (two of each)—was presented
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individually for 3.5 s. The S− s were neutral (novel) stimuli deter-
mined randomly for each subject on day 1 from the initial set
of six characters but had not been presented in any of the pre-
ceding tasks. In order to present an equal number of “seen” and
“unseen” stimuli we also included two additional neutral stim-
uli at this stage. Subjects were instructed to press the space bar
if they thought they had seen the symbol in any of the sessions
on days 1–3. The order of presentation was randomized for each
subject. As with the perceptual discrimination task, the recog-
nition test served to control for the formation of conscious S+
representations during subliminal sessions.
The final task was a supraliminal preference task. Here, sub-
jects were given the instruction “choose the symbol you prefer”
and subsequently made 15 binary choices. These choices were
all possible combinations, randomized, of each of the 6 stimuli:
4 × S + app vs. S + av; 4 × S + app vs. S−; 4 × S + av vs. S−;
1 × S + app vs. S + app; 1 × S + av vs. S + av; 1 × S− vs. S−.
Both options were simultaneously presented on the screen, sepa-
rated by a perpendicular line and remained until the choice was
made. Subjects chose between the stimuli on the left or the right
of the screen using the left and right shift keys and the choices
were self-paced.
At the conclusion of testing subjects were told how much
money they had won or lost over the 3 days. This was summed to
the 100 shekel payment for taking part and awarded to the subject.
All tasks were performed on a PC using the cogent toolbox for
Matlab (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php).
DATA ANALYSIS
All statistical tests were two-tailed and performed using Matlab
and the Statistics toolbox. Chi-square tests were performed by
hand. All means are reported ± s.e.m. in the Results Section.
Percentage correct instrumental responses
Percentage of correct instrumental responses were calculated by
summing the number of “Go” responses following appetitive con-
ditioned stimuli with the number of “No-Go” responses following
aversive conditioned stimuli and dividing by the total number
of trials for each subject individually. This was performed sep-
arately for learning and test trials on day 1, phase 2 learning
trials on day 2 and test trials on day 3. To test whether perfor-
mance differed from chance, these values were compared to a
value equal to 50% of the number of trials, by means of one sam-
ple t-tests. Additionally, this measure was calculated for each of
the two rounds individually (i.e., two pairs of S + s), and for
the first and second half of trials for learning on day 1 (i.e., first
40 trials and second 40 trials) as well as individual round/half
combinations (pair 1 half 1, pair 1 half 2, pair 2 half 1, pair 2
half 2) to assess how performance progressed with training.When
comparing scores on different rounds/halves, we used within sub-
jects paired t-tests. For between group comparisons, the above
measures were compared using two sample t-tests.
Trial-by-trial percentage “Go” responses
Trial-by-trial responses were analyzed by summing the number
of “Go” responses for each individual trial over all subjects and
dividing by the number of subjects—that is the proportion of
“Go” responses made by the group as a whole on each trial. Each
S+ type (S + app and S + av) was analyzed separately in this
manner for each of the instrumental tasks on days 1–3. This mea-
sure was calculated for each of the two rounds and then averaged.
Additional analyses were performed for rounds 1 and 2 sepa-
rately (day 1 tasks), and for each group separately. To assess the
relationship between percentage “Go” responses and trial num-
ber, linear regressions were performed (with trial modeled as the
predictor variable and percentage “Go” responses as the depen-
dent variable) for each S + type, to obtain a measure of the slope
(β) and the significance of the regression. Analyses of covariance
(ANCOVAs) were performed to test for significant differences in
the slopes and intercepts of the two regression lines (S + app vs.
S + av), i.e., for main effects of trial and S+, as well as trial ×
S+ interactions. Since this method does not take into account
inter-subject variability and trades this off for inter-trial variabil-
ity we performed an additional ANCOVA, this time entering each
subject individually into the analysis but binning their responses
into eight 5-trial blocks (for each S+ individually) and determin-
ing a % Go response for each block. This method overcomes the
problem of calculating trial-by-trial percentages for binary data
by sacrificing a little trial-by-trial variance. To test for group dif-
ferences in trial-by-trial performance we performed ANCOVAs
on linear regression lines modeling the differential percentage
“Go” response to the S + app vs. S + av over trials (i.e., S +
app-S + av), for each group. In a stricter analysis we also com-
pared each S+ specific regression line across the groups using
ANCOVAs—i.e., the S + app vs. S + app regression lines and
S + av vs. S + av regression lines in control and reconsolidation
groups, overall, as well as for each round separately.
Perceptual discrimination
Responses in the discrimination task were classed as correct same,
correct different, incorrect same and incorrect different. The
number of correct “same” and correct “different” responses was
summed for each subject. A binomial test was performed on this
score to assess performance relative to chance. We analyzed the
post-testing round in a similar manner. Any subject whose per-
formance differed from chance was removed from the analyses.
We also tested group performance for each group by comparing
the subjects’ scores with chance using a one sample t-test.
Recognition
For each subject the number of recognition responses to the
S + s and the novel stimuli were summed separately (each giving
rise to a number between 0 and 4). These scores were com-
pared using a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test, for each
group separately. We compared the difference scores of recog-
nized S + s minus recognized neutral stimuli across groups using
the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
Supraliminal preference
Choices from the preference task were grouped into three cate-
gories for each group: S + app vs. S−, S + av vs. S−, and S +
app vs. S + av (four of each). Three choices were discarded from
analyses (S + app vs. S + app, S + av vs. S + av, and S− vs.
S−) since they provided no information on preferences between
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stimulus types. In an initial analysis we summed the number of
choices of S + app, S + av and S− for each subject, over all the
choices, to obtain an overall measure of preference. A repeated
measures ANOVA was used to test for any differences in overall
preferences to the stimuli. This was performed for each group sep-
arately, followed by post-hoc comparisons (Tukey’s HSD) in the
case of a significant result. We also directly compared overall pref-
erence scores to each stimulus across groups using two-sample
t-tests. The null hypothesis in these initial comparisons was that
all stimuli should be equally preferred, however, since these over-
all preference measures blended scores from three different choice
categories, we also analyzed the preferences in each choice cat-
egory individually. As these data were not normally distributed
non-parametric tests were used. We first focused on the S +
app vs. S + av choices and performed a chi-square test on the
group summed scores for each option chosen, to assess whether
preference differed from chance in each group. Another 2 × 2
chi-square directly compared these scores across groups. To assess
whether preference in the control group was driven by attraction
to the S + app or aversion to the S+ av, we performed chi-square
tests on the remaining choice categories.
RESULTS
DAY 1
Instrumental learning—percentage correct
Analysis of the percentage correct instrumental responses (“Go”
responses to S + app, “No-Go” responses to S + av) vs. chance
over all subjects, trials and rounds, revealed a significant effect
of acquisition on day 1 (mean = 51.40 ± 0.51%, p < 0.05;
Figure 3A). This score was higher in the second half—the latter 20
trials—(mean = 52.84 ± 0.69%, correct vs. chance; p < 0.0005)
compared to first half of trials (mean= 49.28± 0.77%, second vs.
first half; p < 0.005), and also in the second pair of S + s (second
round) (mean = 52.0 ± 0.56%, correct vs. chance; p = 0.001)
relative to the first (mean = 50.13 ± 0.86%, second vs. first
round; p = 0.077), indicating an effect of learning over trials and
rounds (Figure 3B). No significant difference between groups was
observed in this measure, overall, by half or by pair (Figure 3C).
Note that this measure of performance combined learning
from the S + app and S + av, essentially measuring the dif-
ferential “Go” and “No-Go” responses to the stimuli. Analysis
of percentage correct responses to each S+ individually is unin-
formative here since subjects made significantly more “Go”
responses overall (i.e., leading to the appearance of many cor-
rect responses to the S + app and incorrect responses to the
S + av).
Instrumental learning—trial-by-trial responses
In a more sensitive analysis of the acquisition blocks we looked
at the trial-by-trial change in the percentage of subjects’ “Go”
responses to the S + app and S + av individually, modeling
these with linear regressions (Figure 4). An analysis of covari-
ance (ANCOVA) of these regression lines revealed a main effect
of S+ [S+ app> S+ av; F(1, 76) = 3.99, p < 0.05], matching the
percentage correct analyses, and a significant S+ × trial interac-
tion [F(1, 76) = 7.93, p < 0.01]. The latter result shows that the
divergence of the regression lines—i.e., difference in percentage
“Go” responses to S+ app vs. S+ av—significantly increased over
trials, consistent with a learning effect. We also demonstrated this
interaction [F(1, 636) = 4.1, p < 0.05] in an additional ANCOVA
where each subject’s responses to each S+ were binned into
blocks of 5 trials to calculate a percentage “Go” response for
each block, and entered separately into the analysis (see meth-
ods). Interestingly, although the slope of S + av regression line
was significantly negative (β = −0.31, p = 0.0001), reflecting
a diminishing number of “Go” responses over trials, the slope
of the S + app regression was not significantly different from
zero (Figure 4). This would suggest that since the proportion
of “Go” responses were very high to begin with—presumably
resulting from subjects’ initial desire for feedback in order to
become able to distinguish the stimuli—instrumental learning
of the S + app was concealed by the initial (artificially) high
level of correct responses, which was likely unsurpassable given
the subliminal presentation. As subjects learned that indiscrim-
inately high rates of “Go” responding was suboptimal, learning
to the S + app may have been manifested instead as a resistance
to this downward shift in “Go” responses over trials (Figure 4).
The increased sensitivity of the trial-by-trial analysis revealed
that instrumental learning also took place in the first round
(pair of S + s), which was not apparent in the percentage cor-
rect analysis (Supplementary Figure 1). To compare groups we
performed an ANCOVA of regressions modeling the differen-
tial percentage of “Go” responses to the S + s over trials in
each group (Supplementary Figure 1). This revealed no group
difference in trial-by-trial degree or rate of learning; nor did addi-
tional ANCOVAs directly comparing the S+ specific regressions
across groups (see Supplementary Figure 1 for further group
and round-specific analyses). Our demonstration of subliminal
instrumental conditioning thus replicates an earlier and simi-
lar study (Pessiglione et al., 2008) albeit with differences in the
degree and symmetry of the effect in relation to aversive and
appetitive cues.
Test trials
Successful instrumental conditioning was also evident from sub-
sequent test sessions where subjects were still playing for money
but no feedback was provided, both from the percentage correct
responses vs. chance analysis (mean= 52.81± 1.07%, p < 0.025)
and from a main effect of S+ in the trial-by-trial ANCOVA (S +
app> S+ av; F(1, 36) = 9.85, p < 0.005; Figure 4). Here, the Trial
× S+ interaction did not reach statistical significance, consistent
with the fact that no feedback was provided in these trials and
hence no additional learning was expected to take place (however,
performance did appear to improve to some extent—this may be
explained by poor performance at the start of test trial rounds,
where subjects reported the lack of feedback to be disconcerting).
Again, no group differences were apparent in test trial perfor-
mance either in percentage correct scores (control mean= 53.1±
1.66%; reconsolidation mean = 52.5 ± 1.35%) or in trial-by-trial
responses (Supplementary Figure 2). Over all subjects, test trial
performance was slightly better in round 1 than round 2—both
rounds being significantly greater than chance (Figure 3D) and
showing a main effect of S+ in the trial-by-trial ANCOVA. Group
wise, test trial performance was better in round 2 for the control
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FIGURE 3 | Instrumental performance during acquisition (day
1)—percentage of correct responses. (A) Subjects (overall) performed
significantly above chance, particularly in later trials, indicating successful
learning of cue-response-outcome contingencies. (B) Subjects’
performance also improved in the second round (pair) of learning
compared to the first and within each pair, over trials (on the right). Note,
trial-by-trial analyses revealed a significant effect of learning in the first
round (Supplementary Figure 1). (C) The groups did not differ in
percentage correct responses during acquisition—overall or on specific
rounds or halves. Each group performed above chance when analyzing the
percentage correct scores during the second half of trials and also on the
second round. (D) Performance in test trials was significantly above chance
in both rounds. (Asterisks above bars indicate significance vs. chance,
those between bars are within subject comparisons across halves or
rounds; ∼ , trend, ∗P < 0.05, ∗∗P < 0.01, ∗∗∗P < 0.001. Bars and error bars
represent mean ± s.e.m.).
subjects and round 1 for the reconsolidation subjects; these group
differences were not significant.
Self report and discrimination trials
Importantly, conditioning took place without explicit awareness.
This was evident from introspective reports during debriefs on
day 1. Most subjects were not certain/did not believe there were
any differences in the stimuli they saw and could not accu-
rately describe what they looked like—in keeping with previous
accounts of this masking technique (Marcel, 1983; Esteves and
Öhman, 1993; Kim and Blake, 2005; Pessiglione et al., 2008).
In almost all cases subjects were unaware of how well they had
performed and often reported that their responses were based
on guesses. Some subjects “felt” there were differences in the
stimuli but in no cases did they correctly describe their dis-
criminatory features. This was also confirmed by chance level
performance of perceptual discrimination tasks prior to learn-
ing and post-testing on day 1. In the pre-acquisition round, no
subject differed from chance-level performance with a stimulus
duration of 50ms. The individual binomial tests showed that two
subjects performed significantly above chance in the post-testing
round—these subjects were removed from all analyses. Group
performance in the post-testing round revealed no significant dif-
ference from chance-level discrimination performance in either
group (control mean = 51.07 ± 1.23%; reconsolidation mean =
49.74 ± 1.25%).
Day 3 recognition
Furthermore, in the supraliminal recognition task on day 3, com-
parison of correctly recognized S + s with incorrectly recognized
(i.e., recognized novel) stimuli (S − s) revealed no significant
difference in the control group (mean S+ = 57.14 ± 6.49%;
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FIGURE 4 | Trial-by-trial percentage “Go” responses to the appetitive
and aversive stimuli over days 1 and 2. During acquisition subjects
learned to make fewer “Go” responses to the S + av than the S + app as
trials progressed. In test trials, where no feedback was provided but
subjects were still playing for money, “Go” responses to the S + app
remained higher than to the S + av. This difference was abolished on Day 2.
All statistical analyses were based on linear regressions. Data presented
are from all subjects averaged over rounds. Fitted models (smoothing
spline) are presented for display purposes.
mean novel = 55.95 ± 5.95%) and in the reconsolidation group
(mean S+ = 57.89 ± 6.36%; mean novel = 48.68 ± 5.57%).
There was no significant difference in the group recognized S+
minus recognized novel scores. Thus, these three evaluations sug-
gest it is unlikely that subjects formed conscious representations
of cue-outcome associations. Subject debriefs indicated that per-
formance improved in the second round because subjects learned
to better rely on their “gut feeling” or intuition, and realized that
other strategies (for example focusing intently on one point of
the screen, or trying to infer a (nonexistent) pattern of reinforce-
ment) did not help. The ability to forego the tendency to try
and explicitly unveil the stimuli and their associations with the
outcomes—and instead make what seems like arbitrary button
presses—was initially unnatural for participants. Had the sub-
jects habituated to the masking and become aware of the stimuli,
performance would have been dramatically greater than chance.
DAY 2
Non-differential learning trials—percentage correct and
trial-by-trial responses
Analysis of instrumental performance during phase 2 learning
(day 2) showed that conditioned instrumental responses were
abolished, both in terms of percentage correct responses (in
relation to the original contingencies; mean = 48.08 ± 1.51%)
and trial-by-trial changes in percentage “Go” responses for each
S+ (Figure 4; no significant main effect of S+ or difference in
slopes in the ANCOVA). When scored according to the contin-
gencies presented on day 1, neither group differed significantly
from chance-level, or from each other in their percentage correct
responses (mean control = 48.17 ± 2.26%; mean reconsolida-
tion = 47.98 ± 2.03%). Similarly, there were no group differ-
ences when comparing trial-by-trial responses (Supplementary
Figure 3). The extent to which instrumental performance was
degraded by these non-discriminatory trials, as opposed to inter-
vening time, is questionable, since percentage “Go” responses
to the S + app and S + av did not differ in early trials
(Figure 4)—suggesting that the stimulus-action-outcome learn-
ing had degraded between days.
DAY 3
Preferences
Having established acquisition of instrumental conditioning
on day 1, we next examined the persistence of the (affec-
tive) stimulus-outcome associations that would have presumably
been formed during acquisition (Rescorla and Solomon, 1967;
Mackintosh, 1983), and the efficacy of the contingency change
in phase 2 learning in altering these associations, by assessing the
conscious hedonic evaluation of stimuli. In this supraliminal pref-
erence task (day 3) we also introduced the neutral stimuli (S−)
and asked subjects to choose their preferred symbol in binary
choices of all stimulus combinations. We first assessed overall
preferences for each stimulus type (S + app, S + av and S−) by
summing the number of times they were chosen over all choices.
Repeated measures ANOVAs revealed a significant difference in
preferences in the control [F(2, 40) = 3.41, p < 0.05] but not the
reconsolidation group (Figure 5A). Post-hoc comparisons con-
firmed that the marked difference in preference to the S + app
compared to the S + av was significant in the control group
(p < 0.05; Figure 5A). Direct group comparisons of these overall
scores also showed that the S + av was significantly less pre-
ferred in the control group (p < 0.05) with no significant group
difference for the other stimuli.
In order to examine inmore detail what was driving the prefer-
ences we also analyzed each choice type individually, first focusing
on S + app vs. S + av decisions (Figure 5B). Here again, con-
trol group subjects significantly preferred the S + app, choosing
them roughly twice as often as the S + av [χ2(1) = 8.05, p < 0.01].
In contrast, the reconsolidation group was indifferent to the two
options in this choice type. The S + app − S + av difference was
also significant when directly comparing groups (i.e., interaction)
[χ2(1) = 6.12, p < 0.025].
Finally, to determine whether the preferences in the control
group were driven by an attraction to the S + app or an aversion
to the S + av (or both) we focused on each of the S + vs. S−
decisions (Figure 5C). Here, in the S + av vs. S− choices there
was a significant preference for the S− [χ2(1) = 5.76, p < 0.025].
There was also a greater preference for the S + app vs. the
S− although this difference was not significant. Interestingly,
the latter finding dovetails with the instrumental conditioning
which also appeared to be more driven by the S + av (however
a meaningful direct comparison (e.g., by comparing slopes of
trial-by-trial “Go” responses) was precluded because of the ini-
tial very high rates of “Go” responses and possible ceiling effect
with regards the S + app). This superior learning from the aver-
sive outcome may relate to the fact that a given loss is perceived
Frontiers in Psychology | Decision Neuroscience October 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1051 | 8
Pine et al. Subliminally acquired preferences
FIGURE 5 | Affective evaluation of stimuli. (A) Overall preferences to
the S + app, S + av and (neutral) S−. The distribution of preferences
did not differ from chance in the reconsolidation group, whereas the
S + app was chosen significantly more often than the S + av in the
control group. (B) A similar pattern was evident when only considering
S + app vs. S + av choices. (C) Choices between S+ and S− in the
control group indicate that an aversion to the S + av was likely to be
more significant than an attraction to the S + app in driving the S +
app > S + av preference. (Bars and error bars represent mean ±
s.e.m.).
to be more aversive than an equivalent gain is rewarding (loss
aversion—Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). On the other hand,
the degree of instrumental learning is not prima facie correlated
with the degree of stimulus-outcome learning/preference for each
stimulus in this task. Thus, the difference in preferences in the
control group was slightly greater in the first pair of stimuli (1st
round) even though the instrumental performance was better
in the second round (Figure 3 and Supplementary Figure 1)—
preferences across all choices in the control group were 62% (S +
app) and 31% (S + av) for the first pair of S + s, and for the sec-
ond pair 60% (S + app) and 40% (S + av). Corresponding data
for the reconsolidation group are 61% (S + app) and 54% (S +
av) (1st pair) and 50% (S + app) and 54% (S + av) (2nd pair).
Note that to control for their aesthetic properties, all stimuli were
randomized across subjects.
Test trials (instrumental)
No evidence of conditioned instrumental responses was appar-
ent in either group on day 3 test trials preceding the preference
task. When scored according to the contingencies on day 1, the
percentage correct responses in test trials on day 3 did not dif-
fer significantly from chance in either group (mean control =
51.28 ± 1.59%; mean reconsolidation = 49.54 ± 0.83%) or
differ between groups. In a trial-by-trial analysis of these trials
ANCOVAS revealed no significant difference in “GO” responses
to the S + s in either group—nor were there any between group
differences. Lack of persistence (or recovery) of instrumental
responses indicates that the conditioned preferences revealed in
the preference task were driven by affective properties of the S + s
(i.e., stimulus-outcome associations) and did not result from any
instrumentally conditioned responding. In addition the nature of
responses in the two tasks (“Go/No-Go” vs. Left/Right) differed,
thereby precluding this interpretation.
DISCUSSION
Recent advances in the understanding of emotionally driven
learning have focused on the physiological or neurological
responses evoked by conditioned stimuli. Conversely, the char-
acterization of the higher order affective and motivational prop-
erties acquired by stimuli during conditioning has received less
attention. Yet determining the characteristics of such associa-
tions is paramount, because they allow environmental stimuli
to profoundly influence volitional behavior and decision-making
by initiating desires and aversions, guiding action selection and
controlling behavioral vigor (Rozin et al., 1998; De Houwer
et al., 2001; Cardinal et al., 2002; Dickinson and Balleine, 2002;
Berridge, 2004). The acquisition of likes and dislikes is some-
times referred to as evaluative conditioning (EC) (Rozin et al.,
1998; De Houwer et al., 2001; Hofmann et al., 2010), although
the paradigm used here differs from typical EC procedures.
EC is hypothesized to be a feature of classical conditioning
whereby the CS forms an association with the valence of the
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US and is thought to be one of the fundamental mechanisms
by which preferences are acquired through experience—often
effectively exploited as a technique in advertising by pairing prod-
ucts with positively valenced stimuli (Gorn, 1982; Kim et al.,
1996; Gibson, 2008; Sweldens et al., 2010). Such representa-
tions play a central role in the guidance of actions based on
future reward/punishment—a basic form of decision-making
(O’Doherty et al., 2006). Interestingly, EC has on occasion been
shown to resist extinction learning (Baeyens et al., 1988, 2005a,b;
De Houwer et al., 2001; Vansteenwegen et al., 2006; Dwyer
et al., 2009; Hofmann et al., 2010), though these were supral-
iminal studies and the preferences may have reflected declarative
memory of the original contingencies. We show that human
preferences can be acquired subliminally and still influence long-
term choice behavior. By avoiding the formation of declarative
knowledge during acquisition we provide a critical step in under-
standing the neuropsychological basis of likes and dislikes. Our
results highlight the importance of initial experiences in the learn-
ing of preferences and suggest that the characteristics of their
underlying associations can markedly differ from some typi-
cally studied emotionally learned responses. They are both long
lasting and resilient. These features may explain the remark-
able persistence of many learned human preferences, such as
food tastes (Dwyer et al., 2009), phobias (Rozin et al., 1998),
and brand attitudes as well as the efficacy of advertising in
shaping consumer choice (Sweldens et al., 2010)—even when
individuals are not aware of the learning experience or have
forgotten it.
The necessity of conscious awareness in human classical con-
ditioning has been strongly debated (Lovibond and Shanks, 2002;
Wiens and Öhman, 2002). In a recent study which was designed
to address this question, autonomic (skin conductance) responses
to a stimulus associated with an electric shock were acquired
non-consciously but attenuated extremely rapidly (Raio et al.,
2012)—within the acquisition session itself. An additional exper-
iment in this study also revealed no evidence of conditioned
responses (CRs) during a test session on a subsequent day—
following a shorter acquisition period where conditioning was
terminated prior to attenuation. In light of this, the conditioned
preferences to the stimuli exhibited by the control group here
are striking, both in their magnitude and their persistence over
days following acquisition—enduring the phase 2 manipulation
(which was designed to abolish them) and multiple test rounds.
Subliminally acquired preferences have been previously demon-
strated immediately following learning; once in a similar masked
instrumental conditioning procedure (Pessiglione et al., 2008)
and in evaluative conditioning paradigms (De Houwer et al.,
2001; Hofmann et al., 2010)—though these have had limited suc-
cess and have been criticized on a number of grounds (Field,
2000; Lovibond and Shanks, 2002). To our knowledge, this is the
first demonstration of the persistence of such preferences beyond
the immediate aftermath of acquisition, and their resistance to
alteration.
We caution that there is substantial debate relating to the com-
plexity of subliminal processing of information, and the methods
used to achieve it (Maxwell and Davidson, 2004; Pessoa, 2005;
Wiens, 2006). A critical issue upon which there is no consensus
is the criteria used to determine how effectively a stimulus has
been occluded from awareness, or indeed what exactly con-
stitutes awareness. A distinction respected in the literature is
between subjective criteria, sometimes termed explicit awareness,
and objective criteria. The former assesses the phenomenologi-
cal experience of the subject by way of self-report concerning the
stimuli and the subject’s task performance, whereas the latter typ-
ically assesses performance on forced-choice discrimination, or
signal detection tasks. The absence of explicit awareness does not
imply that the information is inaccessible through other measures
(e.g., forced choice discrimination) which may or may not index
other aspects of awareness, merely that an individual is unable
to report conscious experience of the stimulus’ existence or
appearance—indeed, our study is premised on such an assump-
tion. A number of concerns have been raised with regard to
visual masking paradigms in particular because there is large indi-
vidual variability in explicit awareness thresholds. Furthermore,
even in explicitly unaware individuals, large differences have been
demonstrated in perceptual thresholds to more sensitive mea-
sures (such as forced choice tasks) whichmay go unnoticed unless
sufficiently sensitive tasks are used to assess the level of percep-
tual salience and processing of the stimuli on an individual basis
(Maxwell and Davidson, 2004; Pessoa, 2005; Wiens, 2006). It
is for this reason that we relied on three measures (comprising
both objective and subjective/explicit assessments) to try to elim-
inate the possibility that subjects may have become consciously
aware of the stimuli: forced-choice discrimination (pre and post-
learning), recognition task on day 3, and self-report—all on a
per-subject basis. Moreover, we tailored the duration of stimulus
presentation to each individual’s own performance on the pre-
learning discrimination task. This number of awareness measures
is very stringent in relation to other masking studies. Backward
masked facial expressions are a priori likely to be more difficult to
effectively occlude from awareness, since individuals have a life-
time’s experience of processing facial expressions and therefore
they are much more amenable to detection than the novel com-
plex stimuli used in our task (Maxwell and Davidson, 2004). This
may explain why few of the subjects were excluded based on above
threshold performance, and that even at 50ms presentations the
majority were unaware of the stimuli, in contrast to some find-
ings with emotional faces. However, it is possible that individuals
would have differed with regards to their perceptual sensitivity
outside explicit awareness had additional measures been acquired.
For example, a discrimination task requiring subjects to iden-
tify a masked stimulus by way of a forced choice discrimination
between two supraliminal stimuli may have been more sensitive
to individual and group differences.
The duration of subliminal instrumental (stimulus-action-
outcome) learning has not previously been addressed—to our
knowledge—but appears to fall somewhere in the middle, persist-
ing beyond acquisition (apparent in test trials) but not to the same
extent as the (stimulus-outcome based) preferences. Thus, even
at the start of the non-differential conditioning trials on Day 2,
behavior did not appear to be under the control of the instrumen-
tal associations formed on Day 1. This was also the case with non-
consciously acquired skin conductance responses in Raio et al.
(2012), but in that study, the responses began to decline within
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the acquisition block and were not apparent at all by the end of the
learning trials. Nor was there any strong indication of persistence
of this learning on Day 3 test trials, in either group. This dissoci-
ation suggests that long-term consolidation of instrumental con-
ditioning may be more dependent on conscious awareness than
the affective responses supporting liking are, or that the extent
to which perceptually degraded stimuli have access to these dif-
ferent aspects of cognition and their associated neural structures
is not uniform, with a higher threshold required for the former.
Alternatively, the higher order affective and motivational associ-
ations formed with the stimuli may be much more resilient and
less prone to degradation over time, or with behavioral manipu-
lation (such as extinction training), than either instrumental or
more reflexive Pavlovian responding. This dissociation is com-
monly observed in animal models of addiction where effects
such as conditioned reinforcement—the ability of Pavlovian cues
to support new learning—persist for months without any fur-
ther experience of drug administration, and are also resistant to
extinction of the original stimulus-action-outcome learning, and
devaluation of the US (Everitt and Robbins, 2005; Milton and
Everitt, 2010); a strong factor leading to cue induced relapse dur-
ing periods of withdrawal. The general Pavlovian description of
preference formation posited in the EC literature does not neces-
sarily imply that preferences resulting from our task are based on a
similar, direct association between the stimulus and the affective
properties of the US (outcome)—a number of other, less direct
associations may be at play here. Given the dissociation between
instrumental responses and preferences on day 3 however, it is a
fair assumption that these responses were governed by separate
associations.
Our results indicate that despite the strength of appetitive and
aversive affective associations, they can also undergo reconsol-
idation. Existing human reconsolidation studies focus on clas-
sical fear conditioning, employing primary reinforcement (e.g.,
Schiller and Phelps, 2011). In that paradigm, a technique of post-
reactivation extinction learning has been successful in preventing
spontaneous recovery of autonomic skin responses (Schiller et al.,
2010; Oyarzún et al., 2012) (but see Kindt and Soeter, 2013;
Delamater and Westbrook, 2014, for counter examples). More
recently this technique has been used in the appetitive domain
to ameliorate the motivational salience of drug associated stim-
uli (Xue et al., 2012). Our result provides further evidence for
the efficacy of post-reactivation manipulation of reconsolidation,
perhaps even beyond the prevention of spontaneous recovery,
but in altering associations that are strong enough to be resis-
tant to extinction protocols in the first place. However, our
paradigm differs in the nature of both reactivation and manip-
ulation employed. The use of extinction trials as a means of
reactivating memory prior to identical extinction trials invites the
question as to whether the effect is engendered by spaced extinc-
tion rather than reconsolidation manipulation (Alberini, 2013).
Here, the test trials used for reactivation differed from the phase
2 learning and did not lead to any degradation of the learned
associations (as gaged by instrumental responses on day 1) prior
to the phase 2 trials. Furthermore, the subliminal nature of the
task also ensured that declarative knowledge played no part in
the acquisition and alteration of the learned associations, thus
eliminating a potential confounding variable (Schiller and Phelps,
2011).
These findings show that reconsolidation is a wider phe-
nomenon than previously described, common to a number of
forms of associative learning as well as learning driven by sec-
ondary reinforcement such as money, and can occur without
awareness. Our results seem to counter a recent theory that new
learning (or the generation of a prediction error) is required dur-
ing reactivation in order to trigger reconsolidation (Pedreira et al.,
2004; Morris et al., 2006; Díaz-Mataix et al., 2013; Sevenster et al.,
2013). Here, no new learning took place during the reminder test
trials since there was no feedback, consistent with other exam-
ples from the animal literature (Duvarci and Nader, 2004) where
reconsolidation was triggered by identical trials involving no new
learning, and a human study (Hupbach et al., 2008) showing that
a novel environment does not trigger reconsolidation. The exact
rules governing the updating processes during reconsolidation are
not yet fully understood and there exist many counter examples to
most boundary conditions (Alberini, 2013). Another possibility
is that boundary conditions governing updating of certain forms
of learning are different to others, such as human preferences.
It is important to note that although an effect on reconsolida-
tion may be one explanation of the group differences observed
here, the critical difference was the reminder, and since there was
no additional group with a reminder before the manipulation,
or long after it, we were unable to conclusively conclude that a
reconsolidation window was opened or what its duration was.
Moreover, the validity of the reconsolidation window concept has
recently come into question (Delamater and Westbrook, 2014)
based on findings that reactivation treatment may work whether
it occurs within the window or not, e.g., by ordering extinction
training prior to the reminder (Baker et al., 2013; Millan et al.,
2013; Stafford et al., 2013). Finally, we note that an alternative
account of our results could be based on a difference in renewal
of the learned associations on day 1 in the two groups. One could
assume that the day 2 reminder trials (due to their similarity to
(no-feedback) test trials on day 1) rendered the “context” of day 2
similar to that of day 1 for the reconsolidation group, but not for
the control group. It could then be argued that the (no-feedback)
test trials on day 3 activated the context of day 1 for the control
group but not for the reconsolidation group—akin to an AAA
vs. ABA renewal comparison for the reconsolidation and con-
trol groups respectively. Alternatively, the reminder instructions
explicitly referencing the previous day’s learning in the reconsoli-
dation group, could have rendered this akin to an AAB vs. ABC
context procedure, with the latter occasionally showing more
renewal (e.g., Üngür and Lachnit, 2008).
Although higher order incentive learning aids in the procure-
ment of rewards and avoidance of punishment, it can sometimes
go awry—aberrant affective salience of environmental cues is
critical in the maintenance of disorders such as addiction, post-
traumatic stress disorder and phobias. For instance, in addiction,
cues and contexts associated with drug taking are attractive and
can induce immense cravings, hijacking behavior to seek drugs
and leading to relapse (Berridge, 2004; Berridge and Aldridge,
2009; Milton and Everitt, 2010). We conclude that our data
may support the use of reconsolidation-targeted treatments to
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overcome the long-lasting, maladaptive influences of these cues
on human behavior.
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